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AND THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE COl:lHUNITY,'; 
Richard R. Nelson 
Yale University 
What kind of role can be played by the scientific commcnity in a 
less developed co.untry in furthering the country's development? In this 
paper I will try to develop a perspective on this question by describing the view 
of underdevelopment and the development process that tends to be held 
by development economists and then contrasting the econ.omist ~ s view with 
the one that tends to be held by the natural scientist. The development 
economist, by and large, has placed less 1-1eight on organized science as a 
factor in development than has the natural scientist; while the economist 
may underestimate the role of science in development, the natural science 
community may overestimate it. In any case the reasons for the differences 
are well worth exploring. 
Section I will review the nature of the economic development problem 
as viewed by many development economists. I shall consider both the informal 
theorizing based on relatively rich appreciation of facts and numbers 
associated with the condition of "less developed", and the more formal theory, 
*This paper has been changed in significant respects from the pre­
conference version as a result of the education the author received at the 
conference, and the suggestions of Yale colleagues Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, 
Robert Evenson, and Yoav Kislev. 
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sharper but less rich, that has evolved in attempts t'e "explain" the anatomy 
of underdevelopment. 
The economist I s view of causation is strikingly different from that 
which seems to characterize the literature on science and technology in 
To put it overlydevelopment written by natural scientists and engineers. 
simply, the economist tends to view economic development as a process of 
"investment;" the natural scientist· views the process as that of "technology 
transfer" and "adaptation". It seems to me that both are half right. I 
will discuss these differences in Section II. Section III will focus on the 
role of the science community in the less developed countries, in the context 
of the earlier discussion of causation and process. m1ile I coMe up with 
more questions than answers, perh§:ps the questions are closer to the right 
ones than those that have been posed by either the main line development 
economists or the natural scientists. And posing the right questions 
certainly is an important step towards getting the right answers. 
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The Nature and Causes of Underdevelopment; The View of 
the Development Economist 
Almost all poor countries would be considered less developed (Japan 
of a decade ago being a possible exception) and almost all less developed 
countries are poor (but not Kuwait for example). However, underdevelopment 
clearly is a more complex phenomenon than simply low per capita income. 
What are the characteristics associated with being underdeveloped? What 
explains the vast differences across nations in degree .of development? 
How can development be initiated or accelerated? This trio of related 
questions has been the central concern of development economists, going 
back as far as Adam Smith, and considerable research has been directed 
toward them particularly over the past twenty years. I think it fair to 
say that we now know a good deal about the first question which involves 
description, signifi:ccantly less about the second which requires specification 
of causation, and still less about the third which requires in addition 
knowledge about how to break into the causal system effectively and reliably. 
In many ways the situation is similar to that in meteorology where a vast 
amount is known about various complexes of weather conditions, there .is some 
considerable knowledge of the "whys" behind what we observe and relatedly 
some ability to predict weather, but very limited ability to deliberately in­
fluence what the weather will be. 
We understand the anatomy of underdevelopment in some considerable 
1
detail. We know for example that low per capita income tends to go with: 
high percentage of the work force in agriculture, a large percentage of the 
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small manufacturing sector in industries like textiles and food stuffs, 
high birth and death rates, small amounts of physical capital per worker, 
and levels of averagelimited communications systems, low literacy rates 
educational attainment, very few doctors per person. The terms "large" 
and "small" here of course are meant as comparisions with the situation in 
"developed" countries as measured by per capita income. If we look at the 
development of countries over time the dynamic picture is consonant with the 
cross section; as per capita income rises in a country so does the percent 
of the work force in manufacturing, capital per worker, education, etc. 
The relative importance ef a nation's scientific community clearly is 
related to the level of develop!l,J.ent where$ following the definitions used 
by UNESCO, the scientific community is meant to include engineers and 
technicians of advanced training as well as scientists. Less developed 
countries are characterized by a small fraction of scientists and engineers 
in the work force compared with more developed countries, and very limited 
R and D. Further, the importance of the science coinmuni ty tends to grow 
as the country develops over timeo I mention these totally unstartling Jacts 
because for some reason some people seem to have been impressed by them. 
2 
Many factors are associated with being less developed and change toward the levels 
as the country develops.associated with the more developed countries 
Whether the association between the level of development and the level of 
science yields any guide to development policy and strategy would appear to 
hinge on two question, To what extent can the low level of science in the 
less developed countries be consid2red as "caus al
11 ra.thP.r than caused? 
If causal, to what extent and at what cost can science and engineering in 
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the less developed countries be effectively and reliably augmented or 
enriched? 
The economist's vie.;-1 of econor.i.ic causation traditionally has involved 
two chains. The first is that inputs cause or permit outputs, that output 
generates income, that income generates demands for the use of resources. 
The factors toward the end of the list above--particularly capital per worker 
and the education of the work force--together with such exogenous variables 
as the natural resource base, climate, etc" , have been treated as caus~l 
with low productivity, low income, and consumption demand concentrated on 
subsistence consumer goods, as the economic consequences. The second 
causal chain relates to the environment of international trade opportunities. 
The allocation of economic inputs in a country is influenced not only by 
demand patterns, but by comparative advantage which resides in industries 
which employ inputs that are relatively plentiful and which require little 
of the scarce inputs. 
From this perspective science plays an ambiguous role. It seems plausible 
that the availability of scientists and engineers is a constraint on produc­
tion, thus their linited quantity in the less developed countries mi~ht 
be a factor "explair, ~ _;'' low average labor productivity and the pattern of 
economic specialization. But the exact way that scientists and en5;ineers 
determine what can be produced is less clear than the way, say, machinery 
or simple p~oduction skills or managerial ability limit production. The 
lack of clarity here is not just in the eyes of the development economist. 
In only a few industries do business firP.J.s feel compelled to hire large 
quantities of scientists and eng:L1eers without some kind of p;overnnent 
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subsidy, particularly not in the less developed countries. While the evidence 
is clear on the importance of government support of applied Rand Din 
such fields as defense and health, policy makers in all countries, rich 
and poor, have been wrestling for some time with the question of what basic 
research really does for the country. 1·1hile public funds have usually been 
forthcomin8 they have in large part been based on faith in practical payoff 
rather than on hard evidence, and in part have been justified by science 
as a value in itself rather than a neans to other values. Thus the statement 
that rich countries have more science because they can afford more science 
may be as true as the statement that the rich countries are rich because 
of their science. The issue of principle direction of causation is in part 
an empirical question, but it cannot be answered simply by seeing what goes 
with what. Rather a real causal theory is needed which generates a variety 
of implications which can be tested. 
It is important to stress that, unlike understanding of the anatomy 
of underdevelopment where most development economists see eye to eye, and 
unlike broad qualitative description of causation where there is considerable 
agreement, there is no consensus among development economists about the 
formal quantitative tueory linking "causes" to "effects". lfuch of the formal 
theoretical literature consists of a collection of often ingenious and provoca~ 
tive, but partial and usually mutually inconsistent, sub-theories. However 
there does exist one body of formal theory of relatively global scope that 
many economists, perhaps the majority, take seriously and which seems 
worthwhile to discuss here. I shall call this theory, for short, the neo­
classical theory of production and distribution. The theory has two 
separable components. The first is the hypothesis of a cross country 
production function. The second is the hypothesis of competitive market 
3·1·b ·equi J. rium. 
The production function hypothesis is that differences in output per 
worker between, say, Colombia, Japan, and the United States are the result 
of differences in factors like machinery per worker and educational levels 
in the quite explicit sense that if the United States had the same quan­
tities of these factors as Colombia (or Japan) her labor productivity 
would be the same, and if Colombia (or Japan) had the factor endowment of 
the United States her labor productivity would be equal to that of the 
United States. As we look across countries at the different levels of 
productivity and associated inputs, we really are observing different 
points on the same function relating productivity to inputs--to use the 
economist's jargon--all economies are on the same "production function". 
It is apparent that, depending on the restrictions one places on the nature 
of the production function, the hypothesis can either be empty in the sense 
of not really being falsifiable, or quite powerful in that there are many 
ways to refute it. If few restrictions are put on the '¼lnmber of factors" 
used to explain productivity differences, or on the "shape" of the function, 
since the number of observations is finite, with enough ingenuity one can 
"explain" as closely as one chooses. On the other hand if one places some 
quite stringent restrictions on the number of admissable factors limiting 
them to, say, physical capital per worker and educational attainments, and 
imposes some strong restrictions on the shape of the function, say continuous 
and concave, then if much of the international productivity differences 
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can be explained by the theory, one really has "explained" something. 
There have been a number of empirical studies dedicated to testing this 
hypothesis by statistical regression techniques. Output for the economy 
as a whole, or for particular sectors or industries is regressed against 
various sets of inputs. A variety of functional forms have been assumed. 
Not suprisingly the goodness of fit of the looser jointed studies has been 
significantly better than the goodness of fit of the studies where severe 
restrictions were placed on the hypothesis. 
Much more interesting are the empirical studies which have incorporated 
the second component of the nee-classical hypothesis. The market equilibrium 
hypothesis ~EL that the constellation of inputs and outputs observed in a 
country are consistent with the equilibrium conditions generated or inforced 
by competition. This means that the observed payments to the different 
factors of production can be interpreted as !!leasures of their marginal 
productivity (partial derivatives). Depending on how one looks at it, this 
hypothesis provides a way to estimate the slope of the production function 
at different points without doing statistical regression, or some r;ather 
strong constraints on the shape. 
There is a considerable body of literature attempting, within the 
framework of this theory, to relate cross country differences in value 
4 
added per worker to differences in the physical capital-labor ratio. 
One version of the theory postulates that output per worker, Q/L, is a 
differentiable, increasing and concave functien of the capital-labor ratio, 
K/L, holding other factors constant, as illustrated by Figure 1. Thus 
5 
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1964 value added per worker in Colombian manufacturing industry was about 
$3,000 and the capital-labor ratio was about $6,000. This provides a point 
on the function. The rate of return on capital averaged about 25%. 
This provides a measure of the slope of the function at that point under 
the '-'marginal. productivity" hypothesis. The capital-labor ratio~•in the 
United States was about $24,000. Since a concave function must lie under 
any of its tangent lines, multiplying $18,000 ($24,000 - $6,000) by .25 
yields an overestimate of how much greater Colombia's output per worker 
would be at U.S. capital-labor ratio. $7,500 thus is an upper bound on 
what output per worker in Colombia would be if the assumptions of the theory 
hold, Colombia's capital stock per worker were augmented to equal that in 
the United States, and no other differentiating characteristic (like educa­
tional attainment) change. Since U.S. value added per worker is about $12,000, 
differences in the capital-labor ratio are only part of the story. 
The assumed concavity of the production function means that the linear 
approximation above is an over.estimate, not an "estimate". Economists 
long have been attracted to a specific form of the production function 
that builds in concay::.ty--a function that specifies output per worker as 
a log linear function in capital per worker. Under these assumptions and 
given the numbers it can be shovm that a quadrupling of the capital-labor 
ratio (which would bring Colombia in line with the United States) would 
double productivity, a significantly smaller impact than the "overestimate" 
developed above (see Figure 1). For a variety of reasons some economists believe 
that the log linear form (in the economics literature called a Cobb-Douglas 
form) underestimates the concavity of the production function. In some 
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of the more recent studies economists have shown a preference for a form 
with considerable concavity implying that differences in the capital-labor 
ratio explain only about half of the difference that is implied by the use 
of a Cobb-Douglas form. 
One can attempt to estimate the effect upon productivity of the lower 
6educational attainments of the less developed countries in the same manner. 
About 30% of the work force in Colombian manufacturing industry had a 
secondary school education or better compared with 80% in the United States. 
Only 3% had attended some college compared with about 20% in the United 
States. It is possible to get rough figures on the average earnings of 
Colombian workers of different levels of educational attainment: not 
suprisingly the higher the education the higher the earnings. If one assumes 
th:at these earnings reflect marginal productivity one can make an "overestimate" 
of the effect of the differences in educational attainment on productivity. 
The results are roughly similar in quantitative impact to those for 
physical capital. Under the assu~ptions of the theory differences in the 
educational distribution explain less than 1/2 of the productivity differ­
ences. How much le~s than 1/2 depends on what one assumes about the curvature 
of the function. Again, as with physical capital, :i'f one assumes:a log 
linear form the answer is significantly less. 
An interesting question is, are the bvo calculations additive? The 
answer is yes for both the linear and the log linear calculations. The 
sum of the linear extrapolations is an overestimate of the effect of 
bringing both physical capital per worl:er and educational standards to 
U.S. level. The sum of the two "log linear" calculations gives the con-
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sequences of changing both factors to U.S. levels if the production function 
was in fact log linear in both of those factors. The upshot is that togither 
these two factors cannot explain all of the observed productivity differences, 
although they may be able to explain a considerable portion. 
I have discussed these kinds of calculations in some detail to familarize 
the non-economist with the existing mainline theory in economics and to 
point out that a significant portion of international differences in develop­
ment levels can be explained by factors that have little to do directly 
with differences in science and technology. There are a number of basic 
difficulties with the theory sketched above that I will not go into here. 
Some of these will be discussed in the context of comparison of the 
"neo-classical" theory with the "technology gap" theory, to which I now turn. 
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The Processes of Economic Development: Investment 
and Technology Transfer 
The restiveness that many natural scientists and engineers (and 
many economists, including myself) feel when they try to reconcile their 
perception of the anatomy of underdevelopment with the neo-classical theory 
can best be brought into focus by considering the process of development 
implicit in that theory. The neo-classical theory views the process of 
development in terms of increases in the various factors that comple1:1ent 
labor, raise its productivity, and which chan3e the pattern of demand and 
comparative advantage. Host of these factor$ are expanded by the deliberate 
use of res:ources for that purpose--labor, materials, and capital to build 
new machines, teachers, school buildings to extend education. Thus development 
can be viewed as the result of investment of various types. Just as cross 
country differences in output and inputs are interpreted as different 
points along a production function, grovth is viewed as movement along it. 
There exists a substantial body of literature on growth of the developed 
countries, particularly the United States, within this framework. The 
studies of the less developed countries done within this framework have 
been able to account for most of growth by increases in the capital stock 
and education, with some interesting exceptions like Taiwan, Israel, and Japan. 
This description of the "process" of developnent, whatever its merits 
in terms of statistical fit, seems inadequate or misleading to observers of 
less developed countries who have been irrpressed by the vast differences 
in technological capabilities. The discussion of "process" seems to highlight 
that differences in aggregative measures of capital stock and educational 
7 
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attainments somehow do not capture fully the apparent lack of capability 
in less developed countries to set up and operate an electronics products 
factory, run a railroad, keep the telephone system goin~, deal with epidemics. 
Expansion of capital and education fails to characterize adequately all 
that is needed to acquire these capabilities. Part of the difficulty 
with the neo-classical theory may be that in the forI!l abot-e it is too 
aggregative; it represses the iBportance of scientific and technical skills 
by lumping then under education and capital. But I think there is More 
to it than that; the implicit dynaI!lics do not rinP, ri~ht. In fJ'f judgment 
the problem boils down to two sets of questions. First, is there something 
involved in "chanr;inr;" the way an economy operates that transcends the 
difference between the equilibrium characterizations of the initial and 
terminal positions? Second, is there somethin~ about a nation's scientific 
community that is particularly important in the chan~e process? I believe 
the answer is yes to both of these questions. 
Before considering the poor countries and their development it is 
useful to refer briefly to a debate that has been foinf:s on amonl", economists 
about economic growth in advanced countries, particularly the United States. 
The issue is the relative importance of, and analytic treatment of, tech­
nological change in the zrowth process. As suc:~ested above there is a school 
of analysis that is attemptinp.; to account fully for f,:rowth within the neo­
classical theory. Research and development is visualized as a form of 
8
investment: that enhances the quality or productivity of other innuts. 
Other people have argued that this vie,, represses the dynamics of the process 
and thereby obscures rather than clarifies. Thus in the nee-classical 
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view the returns to education are determined by the relative availability 
of complementary inputs such as unskilled.labor and capital. This obscures 
that highly educated people in research and development r:ia.na~ement and 
production are largely involved in creating new technology, making decisions 
regarding its merit, finding out how to use it effectively, Retting the 
bugs out, and routinizing its operation so that people with lesser training 
can operate it. Once the new technology is created, selected, put in place, 
and has become familiar, the advantages of scientific and technical expertise 
is greatly reduced. Or consider the conditions under which there are hip;h 
returns to new investnent. The neo-classical view stresses the availability 
of other factors. The "technical change" view stresses the availability 
of unexploited investment opportunities larqely due to the creation of new 
technological opportunities. Put another way, in the nee-classical view 
changes in the factors of production are seen as permittin~ the econony 
to sustain different points along a fixed production function. In the 
technical change view certain factors are seen as generating new attainable 
points and enabling the economy to move along an evolving production function. 
Several of the recent studies in effect brush this distinction under 
the rug. In these studies a considerable portion of p;rowth is accounted 
for by improvements in the quality of capital and increases in the supply 
of persons with high levels of education. The implication sone have drawn 
is that technical c hc[lge has been nuch less inportant than thought earlier. 
This may be very nisleading. The improvements in the quality of capital 
themselves are probably in good part the result of new technolo~y. The 
high rer:iuneration to educated persons that give large explanatory weir:ht 
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to their augmentation is, if the technical chani;e view is correct, intimately 
connected with their contribution to the creation and implementation of 
new technology. If the pace of technical change had been slower we would 
have experienced neither the observed large increases in capital quality 
nor the maintenance of high returns to educated people in the face of 
their relative growth. 
While this discussion might not appear to have much connection with 
the processes of development in poor countries where the creation of new 
technology is not central in the process it does have a cor.aection. The 
link can be seen by considerin~ recent findings on the pattern of international 
trade in manufactured products and the li~ht these findinp,s shed on the 
pattern of comparative advantage in the less developed countries. Recent 
research has shm-m that a very large proportion of U. S, nanufacturing exports 
are in new products that other countries have not yet begun to produce in 
quantity. Uith a la8 other manufacturing nations pick up and employ 
U.S. technology and gradually cut the United States out of export markets. 
With a greater lag eventually less developed countries ber,in to adopt and 
employ the technology if it has not already becone obsolete. This pattern 
is not easily explained by the implications of the neo-classical theory 
viewed as a theory of comparative advanta~e. It is consistent with the 
9technical change view of the economic growth process. 
The theory of technological lead and product cycle sup;gests a quite 
different analysis of international differences in productivity than is 
implied by the neo-classical theory discussed in the preceedinp; section. 
The technological lead of the United States (with occasional competition 
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from a few other countries) must be recognized explicitly. The U.S. lead 
can, at least partially, be attributed to its "endowments" of managers, 
scientists, engineers and just plain innovative and flexible people. Hore 
generally, the position of any country in the diffusion hierarchy may well 
be a function of factor endowments, particularly supply of sophisticated 
managers, technicians, and easily trainable labor. But there is no reason 
to believe that these factors enter in a way that one would try to force 
them to enter in analysis if one followed the traditional nee-classical 
approach. For viewing the economic development process as a diffusion 
process naturally leads one to abandon the two basic assumptions of the 
nee-classical model--that all countries are on the same production function, 
and that markets are im equilibrium and competitive such that the returns 
to particular factors reflect their marginal productivity in the traditional 
sense. 
This point of view also suggests a quite different perspective on 
the nature of the development process in poor countries. In the neo-classical 
theory there is a snese in which the less developed countries are adopting 
the technology of the rich, but the sense is that of two people walking 
down the same path because it is the only path. The "diffusion of technology" 
view sees the rich countries follm-,ed by the poor countries because the 
former is providing the technology and the model for development. This 
is a much more active view of technology adoption or transfer. And it 
calls attention to a variety of ~echnaisms repressed in the nee-classical 
theory. 
As I indicated above there has been far less adherence to the neo-
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classical theory among economists studying the less developed countries than 
among those studying advanced ones. Among the variety of partial models 
of development alluded to earlier are many that view development of the 
less developed countries as a process of structural transformation transcending 
simple gowth of capital and labor. Some of the early (post war) development 
models focused on the fact (in most less developed countries) of significantly 
higher average labor productivity in manufacturing than in agriculture and 
viewed the shifting of labor towards manufacturing, constrained by the rate 
10
of capital formation, as the heart of the develoPme~t process. It now 
is apparent that this view masks the vast differences in productivity 
levels among both manufacturing business firms and farms. The structural shift 
.view of development seems correct bµt would appear to involve a much more 
general switch over from traditional technologies to modern both in manu­
facturing and in agriculture. 
As the product cycle view of international trade indicates, to a con­
siderable extent the more modern manufacturing technolo3y being adopted 
by the less developed countries is dire~tly or indirectly imported from 
the advanced countries. The manufacturing development process appears to 
11 
be characterized by intra-sector dualism. Hhile rapid industrialization 
in many (but not all) of today's less developed countries began only in 
the post-World Har II period, this did not mean that they started with no 
manufacturing sector at all. Rather if the few countries that have been 
studied from this point of view be a guide, they long have had a quite 
diversified manufacturing sector providing a variety of goods for domestic 
consumption using traditional technologies, sometimes augmented with some 
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more modern power equipment. In addition there often were a few modern 
firms or sub-industries, often foreign owned, and often producing goods 
for export. The wave of post-Har industrialization has been superimposed 
upon this traditional structure of craft industry. Today in many of the less 
developed countries one can identify two roughly separable grGups of firms. 
One group, generally newcomers or a few old firms that have transformed 
themselves, consists of firms that are roughly similar to typical firms in 
the same industry in the nore developed countries--somewhat smaller, with 
somewhat lower value- added per worker, capital per worker, and labor 
quality--but using roughly the same kind of technology and recognizable 
as the same kind of animal. The other 8roup is conprised of the traditional 
small craft firms using significantly less in the way of modern equipment, 
quite different (and less related to formal education) skills, and creating 
a far lower value added per worker. To a considerable extent these two 
groups of firms differ in terms of their products. Within the so called 
metal products industry the craft firms produce pots and pans, the more 
modern firms produce parts for, say, washing machines and refrigerators. But 
in many cases there is more direct competition. Craft firms produce shoes 
and furniture largely by hand or with simple power tools, modern firms 
produce competitive products using much more power equipment and mass 
production organization. 
As develoPmant proceeds the modern sector will expand relative to the 
traditional and improve its efficiency. The pace at which this will happen 
will depend in part upon the resources that the society invests in new 
plant and equipment and in creatinp; the relevant skills. But it w-ill 
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depend as well on the more complex structure of incentives, constraints, 
and mechanisms that encourage and facilitate the entry of new firms using 
modern technology, the adoption of better technology by older firms, and 
more generally the expansion and improvement of the modern sub-sector. 
Part of this structure involves the capabilities of the mechanisms for 
interjecting in the right places and spreading the relevant technological 
knowledge. I take it that these are the mechanisms that 8ive operational 
meaning to the concept of "technology transfer". 
In many less developed countries one 1.d>serves the same kind of dualism 
in agriculture as one sees in manufa-,.,cturing, and in many countries the 
agricultural development process seems characterized by the same expansion 
of new modern entities and attrition of old that marks manufacturing 
development. However it appears that in agriculture, modernization of old 
farms as contrasted uith entry of new is more important than in manufacturing. 
Perhaps relatedly in at least a few countries the kind of dualism experienced 
in manufacturing development has not characterized agricultural development 
which rather has been marked by the roughly in pace improvement in efficiency 
of most (or at least many) farms. 
Further, unlike in manufacturing agricultural development has been 
marked by a number of disappointments when a strategy of simple "technology 
transfer" has been adopted--the attempt to increase productivity by replacing 
traditional methods with those used in developed countries. Success often has 
required considerably more modification and special tailoring of technology 
than has usually been required in manufacturins. Clearly agricultural 
development is neither a simple investment process, nor usually is simple 
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technology transfer mechanisms a sufficient complement. Rather, it appears 
to require organization and effort to develop the right kin~s of new tech­
nology. I take it that these mechanisms give operational meaning to the 
coneept of "technology adaptation". 
The mechanisms of technology transfer and adaptation are complex 
involving many different kinds of inputs, relationships, and institutions. 
Important among these are those that involve the national and international 
science community. It is in its contribution to makin~ these mechanisms 
work more effectively that the developmental role of the national science 
community can be sought. 
I 
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The Role of National Science Policy 
Earlier I posed the question; to what extent can the low level of 
science in the less developed countries be considered causal? There 
certainly are apparent causal links that run from availability and 
activity of scientific and technical personnel to the pace and character 
of economic developemtn. It is not clear, however, if the return to putting 
resources into augmenting scientific capabilities is high relative to other 
forms of investment. This of course hinges on the second question that 
posed; to what extent and at what cost is it possible reliably to expand 
and enrich a nation's scientific and technical capabilities? 
It seems important at the outset to set down some points 6f aq,reenent 
between those that take a strong "nee-classical" position and those that 
take a strong "science is important" position. One is the importance 
of improving and expanding the educational system in less developed 
countries, and rapidly and greatly increasing the educational attainments 
of the population. I presume that all uould agree that scientific and . 
technical education should play an important role in this general educational 
enhancement. I think all would agree that at least a few people are 
needed with very high levels of training, and that many with moderately 
high levels of training are needed in industry, agriculture, public 
utilities, to operate the weather forecasting system, undertake resource 
surveys, etc., as ,Jell as in the educational system itself. However there 
may be some strong differences regarding the relative emphasis upon science 
versus other fields, and on the 0alance that should be struck between 
achieving widespread middle level competence versus educating a few to the 
- 23 -
highest levels. I shall return to these issues shortly. 
Economists have been prone to make a sharp conceptual split between 
routine operation and innovation. Particularly where people with strong 
scientific and technical training are involved in operation the split in 
fact is not all that clear; the evidence is clear that a lot of innovation 
comes from wrestling with ways to improve performance and solve prople.ms 
on the job and not in a separate research and development operation. 
However conscious research and development efforts are a major source 
of innovation in many fields. To what extent and in what areas is R and D 
important for the less developed countries? A second area of general 
agreement would appear to be the high value of a national Rand D effort 
in agriculture and health. As auggested earlier soil type, temperature, 
rainfall conditions, the insect and pest population, etc., tend to be unique 
to the country and the sub-area in question, hence seeds, fertilizers, 
and practices that go well in one place (particularly the developed countries) 
may be ill adopted to another. Experience suggests that better technologies 
are possible and need to be specifically developed and tested on site. 
Experience also suggests that agricultural research and development 
needs to be complemented by education of farmers to prepare them to be 
able to assess and use the new technology, and extention to provide detailed 
knowledge and assistance. And the new agricultural scientists, extention 
agents, and teachers need to be taught as well as the farmers. Experience 
in the United States and elsewhere also suggests that the broad field of 
agricultural experimentation proceeds best when the applied work interacts 
with basic work in various fields of the life sciences, chemistry, ecology, 
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agricultural economics and sociology, etc. That the package of research, 
extension, and education typically recommended by U.S. agricultural scientists 
is roughly that of land grant structure in the United States suggests that 
there may be some rationalization in the argument; nonetheless the package 
seems pcssible to put together and while the costs are not inconsiderable 
a case can be made that the returns are likely to be high. Very similar 
kinds of arguments appear germane in the fields of health and medicine. 
The special characteristics of the national and local environment seem 
to call for a national program of medical schools, institutions for training 
other kinds of health personnel, applied research, and the basic science 
support base. 
These qualitative arguments based partly on ad hoc theorizing and in 
part on experience suggest that some of a nation's development efforts 
should be put in these activities. They do not answer quantitative questions 
like how much of a country's efforts should be put into agriculture and 
health versus manufacturing and other sectors. Nor do they answer within 
the agricultural and health programs of a nation how much should be allocated 
to building up scientific and educational capabilities in these fields 
as contrasted with efforts in irrigation, purchasing machinery> buying 
fertilizer> allocating trained medical personnel for dealing with present 
health problems with known methods versus research and teaching etc., or, 
:, ' 
within the science package, how· much applied and how much basic. They 
also pose questions of organizational policy. I do not have any ideas 
on these questions I wish to discuss here. 
The questions I would like at least to pose are first, do these arguments 
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extend to other sectors particularly manufacturing, and second, do they 
provide support for a policy of strongly encouraging the development of 
a significant basic research community. 
The bulk of the applied research and development in the technically 
advanced countries is not in agriculture or health but in manufacturing 
industry. However, unlike agriculture and medicine, technology developed 
in the advanced countries apparently -~an be applied with only modest 
modification in a less developed country, and in fact is being applied. 
While the special circumstances of the local environment--in particular 
small scale of operation, nuances of local materials, the high cost of 
capital, lack of skills in the work force, low wage rates for overabundant 
unskilled labor--makes technology modification desirable, in manufacturing, 
imported technology is at least viable and generally very profitable. 
Further in manufacturing industry, in the advanced countries, there 
is a reasonably well worked out private system of technological commu­
nication and assi-stance that has obviated the need for an industrial 
analogue of the agricultural extension service, and such a system already is 
growing up in the less developed countries. These mechanisms include 
direct investment by foreign companies, patent licensing, privately ne­
gotiated consultative arrangements, technical assistance from suppliers 
of machinery and materials, sending young engineers and mana~ers abroad 
for training and experience. To a considerable extent the lack of need 
for adaptive R and D and existence of private mechanisms of technology 
transfer would appear to reduce the need for national investment in in­
dustrial research and development, and technical information services. 
Further, a case can be made that if such investments are important they 
- 26 -
will be profitable and naturally forthcoming through private aegis. 
Of course that profit can be made without modifying technology is 
no argument that there aren't positive net benefits from efforts at industrial 
Rand D. National governments and international agencies often have seen 
it worthwhile to establish in the less developed countries industrial 
Rand D facilities, productivity centers, etc. To my knowledge however, 
we have very little useful evidence on the performance of those that have 
been in operation. The many laudatory comments that one can read are 
based largely on lists of "achievements" with little or no effort to assess 
their importance, and often on no more than that the organization has 
survived thus far. Both the arguments and evidence for an active policy 
of supporting the establishment of an industrial Rand D effort in a less 
developed country continue to be sketchy. 
One of the research tasks to which I would assign high priority 
would be a detailed examination of industrial Rand Din the less developed 
countries, both public and (where it exists) private. As suP,gested above 
many applied Rand D facilities have published lists of their accomplishments. 
These of course need to be scrutinized, but more important their impact 
needs to be evaluated. The evaluation needs to consider the specific 
economic benefits such as productivity enhancement and cost reduction, 
export yield, etc. But more broadly it seems important to examine the 
extent to which a national industrial research and development policy 
and availability of local engineers and applied scientists can reduce 
dependence on foreign corporation for modem technology, the relative 
effects of these two means upon employment, income of nationals, exports, ete. 
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Here the Japanese case seems particularly worth examining in detail. 
Also Hexico's and India's experience with public applied industrial Rand D. 
The discussion above has viewed science as instrumental and rather 
specific in its impact in that it is assumed that a ccmtry can opt for 
a policy of scientific effort in support of agriculture, health, manufacturing 
or other particular sectors or toward particular national goals. There 
is of course a considerable body of thought that argues that this perception 
of the problem is narrow minded and short sighted. It is argued that while 
tbe sectoral philosophy occasionally pays lip service to basic research, 
it does not recognize adequately the extent to ~hich both good applied research 
and good science teaching require an environment of strong basic research. 
The range of science fields that must be taught even to those that do applied 
research in a narrow field is rather wide. Further, higher education is 
needed for technologists in almost all fields. Thus the higher educational 
capabilities of a nation require that basic research not be constrained 
to those fields directly under the applied research effort. Hore broadly, 
it is argued that the "applied research" philosophy ne~lects the extent to 
which the evolution of a national science community is an important 
input to the changes in ~alues, perceptions, and skills of a nation's 
population that are required for development, and ignores the fact that 
the development of a nation's science community is an important end in 
itself. 
Since most sophisticated proponants of strong educational push with 
"applied research" in selected fields philosophy accept the need for at 
least some basic research particularly in areas where basic knowledge 
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is inadequate to the task, and see the development of the nation's capabilities 
for education in science and technology as an important objective, I 
take it that the issue in question is whether a sizeable special effort 
should be made to develop the scientific ®pabilities of a nation indepen­
dently of any well if broadly defined needs for applied research and education. 
Those that argue the positive side often propose that a scientist, or a 
man with ,e-cnsiderable training in science, is a superior general purpose 
problem solver, and that the nation's need for him transcends jobs that 
one might normally define as scientific or technological. This possibly 
is true to some extent. But economists, lawyers, graduates of schools 
of business administration, and other professionals might counter that they 
too have credentials as general purpose problem solvers. Further, the 
''general purpose problem solver" argument doesn't support the claim that 
very advanced levels of scientific training are needed, and an associated 
strong program of support of basic research. 
I find the arguments in favor of building up a strong basic researeh 
capability unpersuasive. The kinds of correlations between science and 
GNP discussed earlier provide no support at all. However I think we must 
admit, or rather stress, that we know very little about the connection 
between basic science in a less developed country and its economic 
development. What evidence really is there that a strong national tasie 
re.search effort is essential to good applied research and teaching? It 
is apparent that most industrial applied research and development and mos.t 
applied agricultural research and experimentation proceeds with very 
little contact with basic research and indeed with little input £Tom recent 
- 29 -
To what extent do the kinds of applied research that arebasic science. 
important in less developed countries seem to require si
gnigicant basic 
We know that the bulk of the engineers and appliedTesea1'Ch underpinnings? 
agricultural technicians in the United States were not t
rained in schools 
noted for their strong basic research. How strong a tra
ining in basic 
science really is required for applied research and deve
lopment personnel 
How important is what level of scientificin the less developed countries? 
education in entrepreneurship? To my knowledge very lit
tle, if any, research 
has been done on these questions. I do not think we even
 have a detailed 
accounting of what scientists and engineers are actually
 doing in the less 
developed countries. Here I think Japan, India, Mexico 
and Israel would be 
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